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Reforming Corporate Governance 
in East Asia
Meredith Woo-Cumings
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 involved, among other things,
a failure of regulation. Some believe this failure is endemic to global
capitalism, and others believe it was profoundly local and idiosyn-
cratic, emanating from regulatory flaws in the affected countries,
stretching an arc from Thailand and Indonesia to Korea and Japan.
There is also a debate about the nature of the regulation that failed.
Some argue that the crisis emanated from a surfeit of nettlesome regu-
lations and endemic industrial policy; others claim it happened for
want of effective regulations and (even) industrial policy. Across the
hypotenuse of these disagreements, however, stretches a universal
recognition that regulatory infrastructure and institutions do matter
and that they must play a major role in the way we think about eco-
nomic development. After the miracle years in East Asia, “good gover-
nance” has become the Spirit of the Age.
I intend to examine one aspect of this trend toward good gover-
nance: corporate governance. I will argue that the issue of corporate
governance must be understood in time and place, in historical and
political context, which may mean eschewing common assumptions
about regulatory frameworks and reform proposals that make more
sense in settings, such as the United States, accustomed to complex
legal regulation. In presenting my argument, I will also underscore the
enormity of the economic, social, and political problems lurking in the
shadow of this innocuous term, corporate governance. To instruct the
present and to caution future expectations of reform, I will examine
past practices of corporate governance in East Asia. Several East Asian
countries have now embarked upon reforms, prompted by the exigen-
cies of the 1997 – 98 financial crisis and the disciplines of the Interna-
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tional Monetary Fund. Unlike much American commentary in the past
six months, which blames the Asian crisis on certain generic attributes
— “crony capitalism,” absence of transparency, moral hazards, and a
general failure of the rule of law, characteristics considered ubiquitous
throughout the region — I sharply distinguish Northeast Asia from
Southeast Asia and find two highly distinctive patterns of corporate
governance. The first is a Japan-shaped model that influences Taiwan
and the current leadership in China, but is best exemplified by South
Korea (hereafter Korea). The second is a Chinese business practice hav-
ing roots at least 150 years old that is market-adaptive and efficient
enough to need little reform of corporate practice — or perhaps, from
an Anglo-Saxon standpoint, to need so much as to make the task
impossible.
Other experts can say more than I about the types of reforms that
should have occurred or that ought to be enacted now, in the suddenly
distressed East Asian region. I hope to illuminate the nature of corpo-
rate governance and discover what past experiences with reform can
tell us. Finally, I will explore the possibilities and limits of corporate
reform in the current climate of crisis and change: what could have
been done in the past and what can perhaps be done now, given the
very different business experiences of the two regions.
In the midst of financial crisis and International Monetary Fund
reform programs, corporate governance came to be associated with
international demands for transparency and accountability (especially
with regard to Korea’s corporate reforms). Few in the U.S. would
object to these seemingly reasonable general principles. They sound
like sweet reason. But what things are called can be infinitely more
important than what they are. To many people in East Asia, the term
corporate governance has a neologistic ring to it. In the context of soci-
eties that may lack legal norms and traditions that undergirded the rise
of the rational modern corporation, corporate governance is a prob-
lematic concept. Let’s look briefly at several reasons for this, in order to
clear away conceptual underbrush and arrive at a better comprehen-
sion of this complex subject.
The traditional discourse of corporate governance was predicated
on the long-standing practice in the United States of separating corpo-
rate ownership from control. In the context of “modern” enterprise,
good governance is really about holding corporate management
accountable to the interests of shareholders, or reducing agency costs
(meaning the costs to shareholders of managerial behavior not consis-
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tent with their interests). The methods for achieving this accountability
are often formal and legalistic and, according to some, idiosyncratic to
Anglo-American traditions. In this sense, corporate governance can be
thought of as a separate taxonomic entity from, say, “contractual gov-
ernance,” which is said to characterize the “Nippo-Rhenish” model of
business organization. In the latter, good governance is a matter of
reducing transactions costs by building and investing in stable and
long-term commercial relationships among transacting companies.1
To avoid equating corporate governance with the ideal-type of
Anglo-American business practice (which would have limited utility
as a template for countries with substantially different legal norms and
traditions), we can seek a broader conceptualization that transcends
the regional specificity of governance models. Carl Kester provides a
functional definition in which corporate governance is understood
simply as “the entire set of incentives, safeguards, and dispute-resolu-
tion processes used to order the activities of various corporate stake-
holders, each seeking to improve its welfare through coordinated
economic activity with others.”2 In this rendering, both the Anglo-
American and Nippo-Rhenish systems of governance are economically
rational attempts to resolve problems of coordination and control
among corporate stakeholders, and no a priori judgment is made about
the ultimate superiority of either national configuration. This catholic
definition of corporate governance is still, however, predicated on the
highly evolved structure of the modern corporation, with a whole
panoply of legal or otherwise regularized sets of norms that dictate the
behavior of transacting parties.
Furthermore, the debate on corporate governance in the context of
global competition has been particularly fickle and prone to revalua-
tions. In the 1980s and well into the 1990s, for instance, it was fashion-
able to argue that the Anglo-American style of corporate governance
(and various corporate-restructuring movements in particular)
reduced investment and forced American managers to think “short-
term.” In contrast, Japanese corporate managers were thought to enjoy
certain freedoms in retaining excess capital (rather than returning it to
shareholders) and in determining long-term investment strategies
(without oversight of shareholders). Once upon a time, this was
viewed as the core of Japan’s competitive edge.
Today, this historical verdict has been completely reversed. Michael
Jensen argues that in periods of industrial transformation, in the late
nineteenth century and in the last two decades, rapid technological
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and organizational change encourages reduced production costs and
increased average productivity of labor. Rapid change results in wide-
spread excess capacity and reduced rates of growth in labor income,
causing corporate downsizing and exit. The best example would be the
mergers-and-acquisitions wave of the 1980s that ended up sharply
reducing capacity (by consolidating some 1,800 U.S. firms into roughly
150); that, combined with leveraged takeovers and buyouts, repre-
sented “healthy adjustments” to over-capacity that burdened many
sectors of the U.S. economy. Corporate raiders turned out to be the
“ephors,” the overseers, of modern capitalism. Likewise, the decline in
the Japanese economy was viewed as the result of a “structural” over-
capacity, fueled by lax investment criteria employed by Japanese com-
panies and the failure to pay out excess capital in the form of higher
dividends or share repurchases.3
Such periodic revaluation reflects profound (or at least shifting)
uncertainty about what constitutes a good system of corporate gover-
nance. We all agree that good corporate governance is important, as
are motherhood, the flag, peace, and good will to humanity. But what
exactly constitutes truly good governance, and how is it obtained? The
contemporary discourse on corporate governance, influenced as it is
by Western practice and experience, offers little hope of achieving a
consensual understanding of the meaning of good governance. This
makes institutional emulation on the part of “late” developers that
much more difficult — particularly for the economies of East Asia,
where the norm is not the “modern” corporation, with a long-standing
separation between management and ownership, but the family-
owned and controlled firm, which can take the form of the modal
Korean conglomerate, the chaebol, or the Chinese family enterprise in
Southeast Asia.
A reform project of corporate governance first must determine
which measures will work. And the essence of making dramatic
reform work is to ask, “Cui bono?” Societies differ in their collective
goals and priorities, and in the moral valence they assign them, so it is
conceivable that improved welfare of stakeholders may not always
have priority, for better or worse, over other collective goals. The rise
of particular business systems bears some relationship to the collective
goals of the society, whether they are popularly mandated or unilater-
ally imposed from above. The chaebol in Korea, like the prewar Japan-
ese zaibatsu, is unthinkable apart from a massive project of nationalist
economic mobilization that prevailed over three decades, the aim
Macalester International Vol. 7
136
being to create, through all variety of state subsidies and supports,
world-class competitive enterprises. Likewise, the behavior and orga-
nization of Chinese enterprises in Southeast Asia are influenced by the
highly charged political terrain where they operate, leading to catch-
as-catch-can outcomes — that is, ethnic divisions of labor and ethni-
cally demarcated redistributive policies, both perhaps most visible in
Malaysia.
In light of the current debate on corporate governance, the only pos-
sible answer to the question “who benefits” is that good governance
enhances the welfare of corporate stakeholders, regardless of their
nationalities, affiliations, goals, and designs. In other words, reform of
corporate governance has to be plausible in the context of what is (and
not simply what ought to be) and resonant with larger social goals that
enjoy broad support. It is best to think of corporate governance in an
idiosyncratic national context — for example, the absence in many
countries of effective institutions of property rights and, related to that,
the persistence of a traditional, family-owned corporate structure.
Some scholars of East Asian business organization eschew the concept
of corporate governance altogether, and favor, instead, a study of dif-
ferent “business systems.” Richard Whitley defines the latter as a “dis-
tinctive configuration of hierarchy-market relations which become
institutionalized as relatively successful ways of organizing economic
activities in different institutional environments.”4 A “business sys-
tem,” of course, is a distinctly vague category if we are grappling with
the reform of corporate governance. But the merit of Whitley’s socio-
logical approach may be to alert us to the true magnitude of social
change that would have to accompany any meaningful reform in cor-
porate governance. Furthermore, it brings us to that sphere where any
serious reflection on corporate governance should start: state and soci-
ety.
II.Northeast and Southeast Asia between the State and 
the “Sib-Fetters” of the Economy
Westerners have been remarkably consistent in the way they have
problematized capitalist enterprise in East Asia during the past cen-
tury. As early as 1904, Max Weber postulated that the modern rational
enterprise was predicated on “the separation of business from the
household” and the “rational bookkeeping” that would issue forth
from independent firms, thus presaging today’s debate about family-
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controlled firms in East Asia and the lack of transparency in their busi-
ness accounting.5 For Weber, the predominance of family-run enter-
prises and the relative absence of rational accounting were prima facie
evidence not merely of bad corporate governance, but also that capital-
ism in East Asia was not modern, rational, or normal — that is to say
(and Weber said it over and over), not Occidental. Weber found it puz-
zling that the Chinese, who generally seemed to exhibit the appropri-
ate “acquisitive virtuosity” and “deification of wealth” (in the
Confucian sense that wealth was the means toward a virtuous and dig-
nified life), failed to achieve the kind of depersonalization of business
reflected in the commercial laws of the Italian city-states. The “unceas-
ing and intensive economic ado” of the Chinese did not originate in
the legal forms and social foundations of capitalist enterprise, Weber
argued, because of a double bind consisting of a premodern political
order on the one hand and a particular type of kinship structure
(“acquisitive familial community”) on the other.6 This focus on the state
and the family is of particular interest to us here.
Weber had an extensive lexicon for describing the political order
that connived with Confucian and Taoist predilections to deny moder-
nity and rationality to East Asia and that filled the well of ideas and
definitions from which many scholars continue to draw. China had
what Weber called “political capitalism,” or sometimes “bureaucratic
capitalism,” in the form of “usury connected with office, emergency
loans, wholesale trade and industrial ergasteria,” or capital connected
with extortionist practices in office. This lexicon has been continuously
replayed in discussions of capitalism in East Asia, being used to
explain why no capitalism existed in the past and what kind of capital-
ism can be observed now.7 Weber also used the terms “booty capital-
ism,” which experts still use to describe the worst excesses of the
government and the oligarchy in the Philippines, and “pariah capital-
ism,” which remains a common description of Chinese entrepreneur-
ship in Southeast Asia.8 In other words, Westerners have thought that
East Asia possessed a system of capitalism that is nothing like what
Werner Sombart might call “high capitalism,” whether in the precapi-
talist dynasties of a century ago or in the “miracle” economies that
seemed to define the meaning of Third World development for a gen-
eration.
Cultural tendencies or “mentalities” cannot be conceived apart from
the existing political and market opportunities and incentives. Even
Weber, who spoke disparagingly of the kinship organization in China
Macalester International Vol. 7
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as the “sib-fetter” of the economy, understood that the communal, or
the sib, economic organization “protected the individual against the
dangers of proletarization and capitalist subjection.” The patriarchal
sib was, for him, an expression of “the abolition of feudal estates” as
well as “the extensiveness of patrimonial bureaucratic organization.”9
Just as Marx thought religion was both the “sigh” and the opium of the
oppressed, Weber maintained that the Chinese sib-based economic
organization seemed to work both to protect against the incipient capi-
talism of late imperial China and to prevent the rise of a culture of uni-
versalistic trust. That is, in the absence of or amid the rise of a
contract-based system of business trust, one’s own family was still the
best bet. Given the tenuous political exigencies of the Chinese diaspora
and the prevalence of particularistic trust in East Asia, it is not surpris-
ing that this tried-and-true system of Chinese enterprise persists to this
day, especially since the organization of Chinese business enterprises
appears ideally suited for small businesses. But it is also not difficult to
imagine that large, globally competitive Chinese firms will eventually
look and behave more like Western-style enterprises, as they already
do in places like Hong Kong and Singapore; for big firms, sib-based
“familism” may now be yielding diminishing returns as a form of cor-
porate organization.
The main point is that the Western discourse on East Asian capital-
ism tends to miss two key points. First, East Asian business has devel-
oped in a cocoon of particular historic practice, where what appears
irrational from an ideal-typical Western standpoint may be an effective
local adaptation in the interest of wealth accumulation. And second,
development has been so incredibly rapid that practices that might
have been expected to die out have persisted because everything
seemed to work. For nearly fifty years, East Asian capitalism devel-
oped at a phenomenal speed, in many cases in a single generation;
therefore, rapid growth was less the solvent of outdated practice so
much as its preservative.
Today, that era seems forgotten, and the term “crony capitalism” is
often used to refer indiscriminately to the economic systems of East
Asia. But no single category can encompass all of East Asian capital-
ism. Even in the worst periods of authoritarianism in Korea and Japan,
the “cronyism” of Northeast Asia never approached that of Southeast
Asia.10 The relationship between the state and the big corporations was
forged through industrial policy, which was simultaneously discipli-
narian and munificent with regard to big business. But in Southeast
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Asia, the relationship between the state and big business was forged
through an ethnic division of labor in managing politics and economy,
in the context of ethnic apartheid between political and economic pow-
ers. Indonesia under President Suharto was always the worst case, a
classic “cronyism” of sultanlike dictatorship and political monopoly—
a kind of capitalism in one family, with Suharto and his relatives and
children constituting by far the biggest conglomerate. The truly entre-
preneurial element in Indonesia, the ethnic Chinese business class, was
always at risk of being prostrated before the rifle butt or the ethnic
pogrom (or both, as in the 1965 bloodletting). A state like this is ulti-
mately interested in economic development to the extent that it
receives its payoffs, but otherwise is not at all interested in develop-
ment, in part because the ethnically alien group is synonymous with
entrepreneurial business. This does not mean that the state was absent
in the development effort. On the contrary, it played an important role
in expanding markets, foreign capital inflows, new technologies, and
the growth of an urban, educated middle class — in short, everything
that the 1993 World Bank report, The East Asian Miracle, argued that it
did. Suharto worked with and protected the ethnic Chinese, as long as
their payoffs continued. But it is also true that there were occasional
serious efforts in Southeast Asia to break the “economic stronghold of
the overseas Chinese” by excluding them altogether from certain lines
of business, especially in Malaysia.11 The main point is that, in South-
east Asia, the widely discussed lack of transparency and accountability
in corporate governance grows out of a very different state-society
interaction; it is the result of the elaborate ethnic give-and-take of
Malaysia or of the protection/racketeering that prevails in Indonesia.
Westerners are not alone in finding it difficult to fathom the worst
excesses of “crony capitalism” in Southeast Asia. From the vantage
point of Northeast Asian political economy, it can also appear quite
baffling. The Japanese economist Kunio Yoshihara, for example,
argues in an influential book that capitalism in Southeast Asia is
“ersatz” because it is developed by foreign and overseas Chinese capi-
tal and is not, therefore, wholly dedicated to building a sound,
national, manufacturing base. It is also ersatz, he claims, because it is
“technology-less” and, consequently, “dependent” on the multination-
als and because it is captured by various kinds of rent-seekers and
speculators—running the gamut from “royal capitalists” (presidential
families) to “crony capitalists” (private-sector businessmen who bene-
fit from close relations with the head of a state), to “bureaucratic capi-
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talists,” “politicians-turned-capitalists,” and “capitalists-turned-politi-
cians.” In other words, it is a far cry from the Japanese or the Korean
style of growth, which, because it places industrial policy at its core, is
not, Yoshihara claims, a genuine form of capitalism.12 We might call
this the Japan-centric solipsism (as opposed to the Occidentalist solip-
sism of Weber and Sombart), but Yoshihara nonetheless plumbs key
differences between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.
How does knowing the differences between the political economies
of North and Southeast Asia help us understand the evolution and
constraints of business enterprises in their respective areas? Compara-
tive studies of economic development in multiethnic and homogenous
societies are rare,13 although Joseph Schumpeter did allude to the criti-
cal importance of the ethnic factor in class and business enterprise for-
mation, in a seminal essay entitled “Social Classes in an Ethnically
Homogeneous Environment.”14 Despite the dearth of research on the
subject, the ethnic dimension has significant implications for economic
development and business enterprises.
In Southeast Asia, many governments have attempted to curtail the
role of the Chinese through restrictive licenses, protective tariffs, own-
ership limitations, preferential credit allocations, and outright bans on
Chinese activity in particular sectors.15 The flip side of this coin has
been massive government help to non-Chinese enterprises, including
placing entire sectors under state enterprises, giving indigenous busi-
nessmen comparatively easy access to licenses, contracts, subsidized
credits, and joint ventures with foreign companies.16 The Chinese
response has run the whole creative gamut, making adaptability the
highest premium in doing business. This has meant cultivating politi-
cal patrons and sponsors, providing bribes and payoffs to local and
government officials to circumvent restrictions and secure protection,
and creating so-called Ali-Baba ventures with indigenous “sleeping
partners” in whose names the enterprises are registered.17 The alliance
with indigenous patrons does not seem to alter the essential character
of the Chinese firm, however; this family-oriented closed corporation,
based on an individual tycoon and his family, is often thought to limit
the Chinese capacity for capital mobilization and organizational
expansion but, instead, seems to reinforce it. In Malaysia, for instance,
Malay interests participate actively in Chinese companies, but the Chi-
nese entrepreneurs retain centralized control of the businesses by own-
ing large blocks of shares. Lim Mah Hui’s study of 100 of the largest
corporations in Malaysia reveals that the Chinese directors outnumber
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the Malays by two to one, and they tend to possess substantial owner-
ship interests in the companies they sit on, whereas this was less so for
Malay directors.18 Hence, Robert Kuok can be closely associated with a
vast panoply of Malay partners, including representatives from the
aristocracy, the military, and the bureaucracy (but not prominent busi-
nessmen), while retaining his legendary tight control of his vast family
empire.19
The most careful articulation to date of an “ethnic framework” of
economic development is the work by James Judason, also for
Malaysia. In the context of a historic pluralism deriving from ethni-
cally based political mobilization, the goal of the national leadership is
to shape development to enhance the dominant ethnic party’s political
base and to meet the cultural aspirations of “backward” groups. By
retaining a great deal of discretionary control over the private sector
and business firms, the state can facilitate expansion of its enterprises
and enforce “affirmative action” in favor of the economically “back-
ward” Malay majority.
What is the result of this “ethnic logic of accumulation” (as versus
the “national logic of accumulation” that one might find in Northeast
Asia)? According to Judason, it privileges the state enterprise, the sur-
plus from which can be redistributed along ethnic lines, and also the
foreign multinational corporation, which provides the state with a
source of entrepreneurship that is an alternative to the Chinese (as well
as providing employment in labor-intensive, export industries). To the
extent that there is a business alliance, it does not unite the state and
domestic enterprises and pit them against multinationals (as might be
the case in more nationalist states); instead, it binds together the state
and multinationals, often against the Chinese domestic enterprise. This
has been called an “ethnic by-pass,” meaning that Malays collaborate
with foreign partners to avoid dependence on the Chinese (for exam-
ple, in their national car project). There are exceptions, of course; some
politically influential Chinese have managed to do well in import-sub-
stitution industries such as cement, flour, sugar, and automobile
assembly.20 But the state certainly has not favored the Chinese entre-
preneurs (who own most of the Malaysian manufacturing enterprises),
and, in fact, it often harasses them for violating laws on intellectual
property rights, land use, labor, and environment. The upshot is that
the Chinese manufacturing entrepreneurs prefer to remain small and
family-owned, engaged in a kind of “guerilla capitalism” that limits
growth, economies of scale in production, technological innovation,
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marketing, and international competitiveness; the consequences for
regulating wages, industrial safety, occupational health, and environ-
mental protection are disastrous. K. S. Jomo, the Malay economist, con-
cludes that “while [the Chinese] may represent Malaysia’s best chance
for domestic-led industrialization, it is doubtful that they will be
granted the opportunity necessary for expansion.”21 Another conse-
quence of the harassing presence of the state, exemplified by the “New
Economic Policy,” has been to make the Chinese gravitate toward
finance and real estate, investments that offer rapid, attractive returns
and quick exit. The consequences of all this, Judason argues, are struc-
tural inefficiencies in the economy and growth rates that depend upon
both commodity prices and on political priorities that emphasize
employment and stable wages for purposes of the political incorpora-
tion of Malays.22
The historical, cultural, and institutional constraints (and opportu-
nities) that Chinese businesses face in Southeast Asia help to explain
the persistence of the family firm. But several sociologists and anthro-
pologists who have long studied business enterprises in East Asia dif-
fer with this assessment. They have long argued that Chinese business
practices are the same everywhere, whether the Chinese are in the
minority or the majority. Gary Hamilton and Tony Waters write:
A sociology of minority capitalism cannot explain Chinese economic
success when their entrepreneurial strategies in locations such as Hong
Kong and Taiwan are similar, if not identical, to those they use in South-
east Asia and other locations where they are in the minority. And if
accounts are given of the entrepreneurial efforts of the Chinese in the
People’s Republic of China are correct, it appears that the organizational
strategies of Chinese entrepreneurs in China are the same as those else-
where.23
In other words, capitalism is a matter of a particular cultural mentality
—and we are back to a relatively straightforward reading of Weber on
capitalism. (A leading expert on Chinese business enterprises, S. Gor-
don Redding, has titled his book, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism, a par-
ody of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.24) I
maintain, however, that Chinese organizational strategy is best under-
stood as the shadow that is attached not to some ubiquitous Chinese
culture but to a minatory world where trust is low, contracts are not
strictly enforced, laws may be unfair, and the politics of the ruling par-
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ties can lead to riches or ruin. Regardless of which position one takes,
however, it must be acknowledged that Chinese corporate governance
springs from a milieu entirely different from that of American firms.
The same is true of a different form of corporate governance, the
Northeast Asian variety.
III. Corporate Governance in Korea
Korea is perhaps the most pristine case of nationalist mobilization for
economic development, and it may be taken as the postwar exemplar
of the Northeast Asian model — the original incubator of twentieth-
century nationalist industrial strategies. Northeast Asia contains three
capitalist countries that formed the core of the prewar Japanese empire
and whose economic structures were tightly interwoven and articu-
lated: Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Notwithstanding the great human
suffering that Japan inflicted on its former colonies, the postwar devel-
opmental trajectories of Korea and Taiwan were heavily influenced by
the models and policies that Japan demonstrated for them and
imposed upon them before World War II; it illustrated these again —
by example this time — in the 1950s and 1960s, during Japan’s heyday
of rapid export-led growth. Since nothing succeeds like success, Korea
and Taiwan embarked on a similar trajectory of light-industrial export-
ing under multiyear plans, guided by strong state ministries (less
strong in Taiwan than in Korea) and taking from Japan its lessons,
experiences, advanced technologies, and capital. This gave all three
economies a highly neomercantilist, nationalist tendency. In Japan and
Korea, it meant strong state involvement with, and promotion of, big
economic conglomerates (the keiretsu and the chaebol), rather than
engaging in “ethnic by-passing” as in Malaysia. (Malays worried about
the Chinese; but because Koreans worried about escaping depen-
dency, they permitted much less foreign direct investment.)
The Republic of Korea has been a security state in the global system
ever since its division in 1945, and has used these security concerns to
justify the logic of industrialization since the end of the Korean War in
1953. Its critical position during the Cold War enabled it to attract huge
amounts of external savings — foreign aid in the 1950s and 1960s and
foreign loans in the late 1970s and the 1980s. But Korea was a state
born without a capitalist class of its own (and was thus bereft of the
mainstay of capitalist development), so the project of independent
Macalester International Vol. 7
144
Korea was created by a constellation of the entrepreneurial elements
using a credit-based system of industrial finance.
In a nation with a dearth of accumulated capital, business had to
rely on credits from banks that the state controlled and (until the
1980s) owned. Since the firms were highly leveraged, much more so
than they were in Latin America or Southeast Asia, business had to
maintain good relations with the state so as to avert the possibility of
default (through severance of friendly credits). For its part, the state
manipulated Korea’s credit-based system of industrial financing so it
could exert influence over the economy’s investment pattern and
guide sectoral mobility. The highly leveraged nature of business firms
in Korea — the norm throughout Korean history — meant that even
small changes in the discount rate or in concessional credit rates
between sectors could dramatically affect resource allocation, because
the effect of such instruments on the firms’ cash flow position was so
much greater given the high debt-equity ratios. For that reason,
Korean firms closely conformed to the macroeconomic policy goals of
the state.25
We now have the skeletal outline of the different relationship of
government to business in Northeast and Southeast Asia. In one fun-
damental way, however, there is something that these interventionist
states have had in common, bringing us back to the earlier, Weberian,
question of the absence of legal forms and social foundations for mod-
ern, legal-rational capitalist enterprise. In homogeneous Korea, as in
multiethnic Southeast Asia, the state is the guarantor of property rights
(albeit for different reasons); in that context, it is not surprising that the
modal enterprise would also be the family firm. In other words, in
Northeast Asia, too, we find a charismatic political order based on vast
discretionary political power, rather than on the rule of law or norms
that are legitimated over time. Both the small Chinese firm in Indone-
sia, which is escaping from the burdensome legal realm to the extra-
legal “gray economy,” and the Korean manufacturing behemoth,
which believes it still needs to get even bigger, are forestalling the
threat of outright confiscation.
A couple of vignettes of the politics of confiscation will illustrate
how the politicization of property rights in Korea is an artifact of
decades of military authoritarianism. One of the first acts of the mili-
tary regime after the coup in 1961 was an anticorruption campaign that
rounded up the richest men in Korea and stamped them as profiteers
with “illicit fortunes,” although their real crime was to engage in the
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political economy of the earlier Syngman Rhee regime. In the end, the
situation was resolved when the businessmen were allowed to use the
huge fines levied on them to establish industrial firms, donating shares
in the firms back to the government. Banks, however, were confis-
cated, swiftly nationalized, and lined up under the direction of the
ministry of finance. From this point on, big corporations could antici-
pate that political-regime changes would be accompanied by various
kinds of shakedowns, ranging from the payment of huge bribes to so-
called industrial rationalization (involving forced mergers and the
like) to the outright confiscation of property.26
In the 1980 “industrial reorganization” that followed upon Chon
Doo Hwan’s coup, for instance, the three biggest chaebol groups were
ordered to give up firms specializing in the production of power-gen-
erating and heavy-construction equipment, which were merged into
Korean Heavy Industries and Construction. Saehan Autos was forced
to merge with Hyundai so there would be only two makers of passen-
ger cars; Kia and Tong-a were merged into a monopoly on trucks and
buses; the heavy electric subsidiaries of Sangyong and Kolon were
merged with another firm; and so on.27 Property rights were com-
pletely insecure unless the state (often meaning the ruling dictator)
approved of the firm and what it was doing, something that was
mightily expedited by large political contributions. Business leaders
could lose not only their firms but their own fortunes at the whim of
the state.
A typical example was the dismantling of Kukje, Korea’s sixth
largest conglomerate, in 1985. By that time, Kukje was involved in
everything from manufacturing jogging shoes to construction, securi-
ties, steel-making, paper-making, shipping, resorts, tires, farm tools,
running an aluminum smelting plant, and so on. But it was also mas-
sively indebted and split by a long-standing family feud. In February
1985, the government decided to pull the plug on the firm and its pref-
erential funding, and proceeded to dismantle it and turn its assets over
to others. This involved no “due process, no bidding for assets, only a
multimillion-dollar takeover operation shrouded in secrecy.” The rea-
son for this confiscation, the owner of Kukje claimed in 1988, was the
paltriness of his contribution to the ruling group.28
This is by no means an atypical story of “corporate governance” in
Korea, nor was the assault of the authoritarian regime on property
rights limited to big business. The state routinely ignored the property
rights of its average citizens in order to bail out big firms and foreign
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lenders. During an acute financial crisis in the early 1970s, the govern-
ment imposed a sudden moratorium on all payments of corporate
debts owed to the private, domestic financial market, otherwise known
as the “curb market,” with market-determined—that is to say, high—
interest rates. The crushing burden of interest payments on foreign
loans was thus shifted overnight to small investors, who had followed
their entrepreneurial instincts and put their savings in a curb market
yielding much higher interest returns on financial assets than the
banks.29 In short, the problem of corporate governance cannot be
resolved without addressing the problem of the continuing discre-
tionary power of the politicians’ and the bureaucrats’ residual indus-
trial policy, as well as a host of other problems that come under the
rubric of the rule of law.
The history of the Korean chaebol is not old, but the roots of this form
of corporate organization can be traced to Japan. Most of the big
Korean firms date from the post-Korean War period, especially the
mid-1960s, when the export-led “take-off” began. They were bolstered
by economic liberalization that promoted export-led growth; financial
reforms that freed, at least temporarily, financial prices from govern-
ment control; massive foreign aid that continued to pour in as the
result of Korea’s strategic position and its substantial participation in
the Vietnam War; the normalization of relations with Japan, which
meant additional wherewithal for industrial financing; and the avail-
ing presence of the vast export market in the United States. In this
environment of such economic munificence, the government in Korea
helped create a whole constellation of can-do entrepreneurs, who
became the mainstay of Korea’s industrialization.
The question of the deeper origins of the Korean chaebol is important
because the answer explains how things got to be the way they are,
and may suggest possible trajectories for reform. The template for the
chaebol was the wartime Japanese zaibatsu. Korea’s military leaders
who served in the Pacific War (like Park Chung Hee) were familiar
with the model, and the extensive wartime coordination between the
Japanese state and big business, with highly centralized finance as the
linchpin, appealed to them. State control over finance not only made
the implementation of industrial policy possible, but it also bolstered
the power base of the state by creating a whole entrepreneurial class as
beneficiaries of the political leadership. This was no small considera-
tion for a postcolonial state with a military regime at the helm that was
perennially struggling for legitimacy. So the idea was there to graft the
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zaibatsu into Korea; the only question was how to create the Korean
zaibatsu in the first place, out of the ravages of colonialism and war.
The answer was industrial policy that created hugely leveraged firms
as the carriers of Korean capitalism (with financial repression as the
core mechanism for shifting resources from savers to producers). This
is not to imply that Korea’s chaebol have functioned politically like the
old zaibatsu, supporting aggression and huge armaments expendi-
tures. But an examination of the similar corporate structure in Korea
helps clarify the relationship between authoritarianism and its legacy
on the one hand, and the type of big business on the other. It also
underlines the extent and enormous complexity of contemporary
reform efforts.
In the work of many Japanese historians, the term zaibatsu refers to
family-dominated combines that developed following World War I,
using holding organizations to maintain control over their industries
and expanding rapidly in the heavy industrialization drives and
wartime conditions of the 1930s and 1940s.30 Keiichiro Nakagawa, a
business historian at the University of Tokyo, provides a historicist
definition of the zaibatsu as “a major economic entity established in a
developing country, whose fundamental social structure is based on
[an] instinctive gregarious group expressed as [a] family, to pursue an
industrialization process in [the] face of international competition
against industrialized countries.”31 In other words, an extraordinary
family-based combination of wealth and power at home is necessary to
fight more weighty and competitive foreign corporations that arrived
in the world economy earlier. From Professor Nakagawa’s perspective,
it is not so surprising that the Korean chaebol of today is an atavism of
the prewar zaibatsu.
But let’s look more closely at the Japanese zaibatsu, in terms of their
goals, market positions, size, and organization. The late economist
Eleanor Hadley, who was an American staffer and later the leading
chronicler of the antitrust experiment in Japan during the Occupation,
said the zaibatsu were a “political expression referring to the estate of
wealth, and by extension, to the source of this wealth, the combines.”
According to Hadley, the goal of the zaibatsu was not high-market
occupancy of one, two, or a few more related markets, but an oligopo-
listic position running the gamut of the modern sector of the economy.
The largest firm, Mitsui, conducted far-flung operations in coal and
metals mining, shipbuilding, ordnance, aircraft, heavy and light elec-
trical equipment, and various other fields of manufacturing, not to
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mention commercial banking, insurance, and trading. A series of oli-
gopolistic positions, often accounting for 10 to 20 percent of market
output, was the fundament of this zaibatsu, which at the end of the war
employed an estimated 1.8 million people in Japan alone, and two to
three million in the whole of the Far East.32
In 1946, the Big Four zaibatsu — consisting of Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
Sumitomo, and Yasuda—controlled 24.5 percent of the paid-up capital
of all incorporated businesses, and the next six added 10.7 percent, for
a total of 35.2 percent. The same Big Four also accounted for 49.7 per-
cent of finance, 32.4 percent of heavy industry, 10.7 percent of light
industry, and 12.9 percent for “other” fields. The Big Four also
accounted for 80.1 percent of foreign investment at the war’s end.
Additionally, the zaibatsu were divided into numerous subsidiaries. Of
the ten firms designated by the U.S. Occupation for “dissolution,” Mit-
sui had 294 subsidiaries; Mitsubishi, 241; Sumitomo, 166; and Yasuda,
60. The remaining six also had numerous subsidiaries: Nissan, 179;
Asano, 59; Furukawa, 53; Okura, 58; Nakajima, 68; Nomura, 19.33
Because these firms emphasized corporate unity through family ties
and coordination of the subsidiaries by the holding company and com-
panies, they achieved tight control over the astonishing market
breadth of the combines. Even when the companies were “opened,”
two features made the family control of the zaibatsu possible. One was
that stock did not have to be equally paid up, meaning that the families
and the holding companies could increase the “stretch” of their capital.
The other was the implicit understanding that the will of the family
and the holding company would prevail, regardless of their actual
ownership position. Indeed, Hadley points to numerous instances in
core companies at the end of the war when zaibatsu ownership
(defined as the sum of top-holding company ownership, family hold-
ings, and cross-subsidiary ties) fell short of majority control.34 One
might think of it as a remarkable instance of the personalistic — even
feudal—basis of mutual trust to corporate power. The prewar zaibatsu
was an organization that represented a means of extending control far
beyond the controller’s corporate (or partnership) limits, thus denying
independence of action to businesses within the network. The tech-
niques to bring this about included ownership, personnel, credit, and
centralized buying and selling — again with the goal of unity of pur-
pose and action.35 This system of enterprise worked more for market
share than solely for the company’s profit; companies often operated at
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a loss (and, of course, during the war they produced everything under
government dictate).
Of particular interest in the current context of chaebol reform is that
the seven-year American occupation of defeated Japan, with the war
hero of the Pacific campaigns, General Douglas MacArthur, at the
helm and the full panoply of extraordinary powers vested in him and
his SCAP staff, could not decisively break the power of the zaibatsu.
They hunkered down and waited when they could, restructured when
they had to, and transmogrified into the post-Occupation keiretsu, a
definite improvement but by no means the thorough break-up and
reform that MacArthur had planned. One great difficulty of the
zaibatsu reform effort was to pinpoint the line where the state left off
and private business began. The victorious Americans, used to draw-
ing lines in the sand of Pacific islands, could not figure out where to
draw the line in Japan proper.
American staff in SCAP, many of whom were New Dealers, per-
ceived the zaibatsu essentially as products of “tricks” played with hold-
ing companies: once the secrets, like the name of Rumpelstiltskin, were
revealed, the whole system would come apart at the seams. Thus, the
holding companies were abolished, but the system of political econ-
omy in Japan — the triumvirate of politicians (now replacing the mili-
tary), bureaucrats, and business (now called the keiretsu) — remained
intact, favoring the producers at the expense of consumers. This expe-
rience is a strong cautionary note to those who think the reform of cor-
porate governance in contemporary Korea will move smoothly or
quickly. Since the big Korean firms formed under strong state prod-
ding in the 1960s, it has been difficult there, as well, to delineate a
meaningful line between the public and the private. In many ways, the
chaebol have been quasi-state organizations (President Kim Dae Jung
has called them “quasi-government enterprises”), and in others, they
have been immense private domains, “company towns” writ large that
employ, house, feed, clothe, educate, and provide credit to millions of
ordinary Koreans. The chaebol groups are the private agency of public
purpose, having been created through easy credit in the context of
“financial repression” as well as labor repression — in other words,
over the dead bodies of both savers and workers. The question of the
chaebol is at the core of a whole complex of issues, involving banking,
medium- and small-sized firms, land, labor, income distribution, law,
and politics. It cannot be excised from the economic system of Korea
and “reformed.”
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Let us return to Eleanor Hadley’s phrase — “the estate of wealth.”
The chaebols resemble the estates maintained for decades by the
DuPont Corporation in the small state of Delaware in that they meet all
of their employees’ needs. For example, the typical Hyundai worker
drives a Hyundai car, lives in a Hyundai apartment, gets his mortgage
from Hyundai credit, gets health care from a Hyundai hospital, sends
his kids to school on Hyundai loans or scholarships, and eats his meals
at Hyundai cafeterias. If his son graduates out of the blue-collar work
force and into the ranks of well-educated technocratic professionals
(which is every Korean parent’s goal), he may well work for Hyundai
research and development. The extreme form of this arrangement is
seen in the masses of construction teams that Hyundai sends to the
Middle East; every worker departs wearing Hyundai T-shirts and caps
and carrying Hyundai bags, lives and eats in Hyundai dormitories,
and uses Hyundai tools and equipment to build Hyundai cities in the
desert. In the same way that Kim Il Sung built a Confucian-influenced
hereditary family-state in North Korea and called it communism, the
Korean chaebol have built large family-run hereditary corporate estates
in Korea and called it capitalism.
Many also argue that corporate governance (or leadership style) is
militaristic in Korea as compared to postwar Japan — that is, that it is
more directive and authoritarian.36 But that merely suggests another
strong comparison with prewar Japan. Those zaibatsu emphasized cor-
porate unity through family ties and the coordination of subsidiaries,
with control mechanisms that included ownership, personnel, credit,
and centralized buying and selling; there was, however, a separation
between ownership and management. The families with controlling
interests in Mitsui and Sumitomo never actively participated in man-
agement, contrasting sharply with, say, Hyundai, where the founder,
Chung Ju-yong, put his sons and grandsons in charge of core Hyundai
industries and subsidiaries. It might be argued, then, that the chaebol
are even more autocratic than the prewar zaibatsu, because the former
are often the direct instruments of founding patriarchs and their male
descendants.
Here is the rub. To break up the chaebol is to break up Korea, Inc.
The depth of the problem can perhaps be appreciated by remembering
the results of anti-trust legislation in the American experience. The dis-
solution of Standard Oil benefited from the existence of forty-eight
states that were often under separate or different regulatory regimes;
the results were Standard Oil of Indiana, of California, of New York,
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and so on. Because Korea is highly centralized, with no such federal
structure, it has been difficult to devise efficacious policies with regard
to the chaebol, despite the antipathy and resentment they engender. In
fact, some argue that the successive governments in Korea have been
at a loss to define the nature of the problems in the first place, let alone
handle them. This is startling, given the centrality of the chaebol in the
Korean debate on economic growth, social justice, and political power.
One economist argues that, for all the crimes said to be committed by
the chaebol, there is still no clear articulation, for the purpose of effec-
tive policy, of why they are so nefarious, either from an economic or a
social-justice perspective. We need to know whether the chaebol prob-
lem is based on market concentration, ownership concentration, their
lack of diversification, their putative lack of international competitive-
ness, their insistence on family ownership and control, or even their
criminality in evading laws (inheritance and gift taxes, for instance).37
IV. Concentration and Diversification in the Korean Chaebol
In terms of economic concentration, the chaebol are strong counterparts
to the prewar zaibatsu. Even the main organizational difference
between the two—the existence of the holding company in the former
but not in the latter — may well disappear in the near future.38 Almost
all the chaebol groups began when Korea was in a phase of export-led,
light-industrial production. Lucky made toothpaste, Goldstar made
radios, Samsung made clothes, and Hyundai began, with U.S. military
contracts during the Korean War, to transport goods and people
around in war-surplus or cobbled together trucks and buses. Daewoo
was founded just thirty years ago, in 1967. They acquired their typical
large and diversified structure even more recently, during the third
Five Year Plan in the early 1970s; thus they began to develop heavy
industries, including steel, chemicals, machine tools, automobiles,
shipbuilding, and power-generation. By the 1980s, electronics had also
become a huge part of the chaebol repertoire. The expansion of these
firms was stupendous: between 1970 and 1975, the three fastest-grow-
ing chaebol (Hyundai, Daewoo, Sangyong) grew at annual rates of 33,
35, and 34 percent, respectively. This breakneck rate of growth, com-
bined with reliance on politically mediated debt, encouraged high risk
taking and competitive overinvestment in various industries—such as
integrated petrochemicals, which more than doubled the output of
ethylene at a time when world prices were declining and surplus
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capacity was widely anticipated. The same was often true of sectors
like semiconductors, ships, steel, and cars. No wonder excess capacity
bulked large as an explanation of Korea’s serious economic downturn
in 1979, leading to a loss of 6 percent of GNP in 1980. Profitability was
also low in key manufacturing sectors: net profit fell to 1.8 percent in
1971, and it reached about 3 percent over the next decade.39
Still, there were great advantages to the state-directed “big push” of
the 1970s. The experience in managing complex technologies in heavy
and capital-intensive industries, requiring effective coordination and
integration of separate independent components, became the basis for
developing managerial skills, which could be transferred to other
kinds of manufacturing. The largest, Hyundai, has carried on globe-
ranging operations in automobiles, shipbuilding, construction, elec-
tronics, aircraft, machine-building, and many others. Such diversified
managerial skills and market structure meant that Koreans were more
likely than the Japanese to recruit senior managers from outside who
possess a greater variety of managerial backgrounds and experiences
than those in most large Japanese firms. Korean firms are more diversi-
fied than their postwar Japanese counterparts and incorporate more
economic activities within their authority structure and, correspond-
ingly, engage in less subcontracting.40
The Korean chaebol occupies an oligopolistic position that runs the
gamut of the modern sector of the economy. For each of the seventy-
eight manufacturing industries in which chaebol are present, there
were, in 1989, an average of three groups and 3.8 group member firms
operating.41 There are many indicators of the size and the extensive
market position of the big conglomerates. One indicator is to compute
the value-added of the chaebol as a percentage of total industry, which
in 1989 stood at 9.2 percent for the top five chaebol and 16.3 percent for
the top thirty. Alternatively, one could look at sales figures as a per-
centage of manufacturing industries; in 1990, the top thirty chaebol
accounted for 35 percent total sales. The same top thirty also employed
some 16 percent of labor working in manufacturing. But since these
numbers are liable to change as corporate governance of these firms
changes and some firms become independent of the group, it is advis-
able to look at data for individual firms. Sales figures for the top 100
firms in 1981 accounted for 46.2 percent of manufacturing, dropping to
38.5 percent in 1987 and further to 37.7 percent in 1990; this trend is
visible also for value-added: 40.6 percent of manufacturing in 1981,
down to 36.5 percent in 1987, to make a small drop in 1990 at 35.1 per-
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cent. Just as the indicators for chaebol economic concentration can vary
depending on corporate definitional boundaries, the indicators using
individual firms can change drastically as a result of mergers and
acquisitions.42
While the preceding figures indicate a formidable level of economic
concentration, there is also a growing trend in the global economy of
firms scrambling to survive in worldwide competition by getting big-
ger and more competitive. The jury is out on just how economically
concentrated Korea’s chaebol are, given the uncertainties today about
the change in the corporate governance of the chaebol and about how to
interpret economic concentration in light of the accelerating global
trend toward industry mergers.
The thornier issue is probably that of diversification. Unlike the
level of economic concentration, Korea’s level of diversification
remains high compared with advanced Western countries. In 1994, the
number of affiliated firms for the top five chaebol averaged about forty,
to a total of 210 firms, and the top thirty chaebol had some 616 affiliated
firms.43 This extraordinary diversification was achieved primarily by
establishing new subsidiaries: the mammoth and remarkably diversi-
fied structure of the chaebol combined with an open call on state-medi-
ated loans were essential to Korea’s success in gaining market share
around the world, because losses in one subsidiary could be made up
by gains in another. This extensive diversification has been the main
staple of public criticism of the chaebol, but perhaps that criticism
should be weighed against at least three considerations.
The first is obvious: while the chaebol have been criticized for failing
to nurture “core competence” — thereby exploiting more fully the
gains from economies of scale — diversification into many different
sectors can be justified through the gains from the economy of scope (as
versus scale) and dynamic back-and-forth synergy among firms; fur-
thermore, portfolio diversification reduces risk. The second and often
forgotten point is that diversification went hand in hand with special-
ization. Out of the fifty affiliated firms for Samsung, Hyundai’s forty-
nine affiliated firms, LG’s fifty-three, Daewoo’s twenty-five, and
Sunkyung’s thirty-three, only a select few firms in a few sectors were
responsible for the bulk of total sales figures. In the case of Samsung,
only three firms were responsible for 67 percent of its sales, and even
with Hyundai, which is evenly spread out in many different manufac-
turing sectors, five affiliated firms accounted for 70 percent of total
sales; as for Daewoo, four firms accounted for 85 percent of total
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sales.44 If the common complaint about chaebol diversification can be
summed up in the remark that “even in the Olympics there aren’t gold
medalists who can win in both swimming and basketball,”45 one might
counter that the chaebol were not aspiring to win in all categories, but
the incentive system pushed them in that direction. The third and last
point about the merits and demerits of diversification again involves
corporate governance: anytime the structure of a given chaebol changes
as firms detach from the group, the firm is instantly “specialized.”
Over the years, the government has tried—and failed—to use its elab-
orate system of credit control to curtail the chaebol tendency toward
diversification and to coax the groups to “specialize” in a few sectors.
The point about diversification, then, is not that it is ipso facto prob-
lematic, but that it results from an economic system geared toward
protecting domestic producers at the expense of consumers. The chae-
bol firm does not strive to become competitive in all the sectors it enters
because there is little incentive to do so, given that the government
protects domestic producers through residual industrial policy, espe-
cially by limiting foreign competition. It also limits domestic competi-
tion, through the system of “controlled competition.” The important
conclusion for any reform process, then, is not to pile on more discre-
tionary measures to force “specialization,” which the state has tried all
too often (and is trying again today under Kim Dae Jung), but to liber-
alize the market so that open competition can take place. This liberal-
ization would enable the chaebol firms to decide for themselves
whether it makes economic sense to diversify or not.
V. Family Governance, Trust, and Rule by Regulation
Family control of corporate wealth and family-dictated “corporate
governance” are other practices that, over the years, the government
and various critics have sought to curb. How serious is the problem of
family ownership of the chaebol? For the top thirty chaebol, family own-
ership (defined as the share held by the family members as well as by
affiliated firms) totaled 43.3 percent in 1995. The figure for the top five
in 1994 was 47.5 percent, combining the family share of 12.5 percent
and the 35.0 percent share for the affiliated firms. These figures, while
high by comparative standards, have tended to decline over the years.
In 1987, family ownership in the top thirty firms averaged 56.2 percent,
while that for the top five averaged 60.3 percent. There has been a
steady decrease in relative shares owned by the family and affiliated
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firms. But individual families still exercise too much control over cor-
porate governance of the chaebol, and public stockholding remains
weak, despite the quarter-century effort on the part of the Korean gov-
ernment to dilute family ownership of big firms, develop the equity
market, and force firms to go public. For the top thirty chaebol, which
together claimed possession of some 623 firms in 1995, the number of
publicly listed firms was 172, or only 27.6 percent. This figure shows a
marginal decline from 1991, when the number of listed firms was 161
out of 561 firms, or 28.7 percent.46
The salience of the family in Korean business has led some
observers to conclude that Korean firms are really more “Chinese”
than anything else, and that whether in Korea or China, family gover-
nance reflects an immature development of civil society and the rule of
law. Francis Fukuyama argued in his influential book, Trust, that “the
truth of the matter is that Korean businesses, despite their large scale,
do look and behave more like Chinese businesses than like Japanese
corporations.” (He even titles one chapter “Korea: The Chinese Com-
pany Within.”) The question of whether or not the Korean firm is more
Chinese or more Japanese would not be particularly interesting (espe-
cially since the answer is neither—it is Korean), except that Fukuyama
bases his argument about corporate governance on an American
premise that now presents itself as the global zeitgeist. There is,
according to Fukuyama, a “convergence of institutions around the
model of democratic capitalism” at the “end of history,” with “virtu-
ally all serious observers” agreeing that liberal political and economic
institutions depend on a healthy and dynamic “civil society” for their
vitality. In this way, Fukuyama adds an economic dimension to the
argument made famous by Robert Putnam in his Making Democracy
Work — that true democracy cannot be achieved without the presence
of a thick web of civic institutions.47 The absence of such a healthy
“civil society,” defined as a complex web of voluntary associations and
intermediate institutions, is thought to characterize low-trust societies
with Confucian and Catholic cultures where family-based firms pre-
dominate. Instead of civil society, these cultures exhibit what Edward
Banfield once described as “amoral familism,” meaning that people
will maximize the material, short-run advantages of the nuclear fam-
ily, rather than pursue individual or societal goals. The economic
effects of amoral familism, Banfield famously argued, create a “very
important limiting factor in the way of economic development in most
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of the world. Except as people can create and maintain corporate orga-
nization, they cannot have a modern economy.”48
Amoral familism (or the absent Anglo-Saxon civil society) is syn-
onymous with a pre-modern economy and the predominance of fam-
ily firms. But there are many problems with this argument. To the
extent that one accepts this characterization of places as diverse as
Korea, China, and southern Italy (Banfield’s locus of specialization),
one can give up any hope of corporate reform because family gover-
nance bears an indelible and ineradicable historical and cultural
stamp. But the argument is wrong; it does not explain family gover-
nance of Korean corporations.
We have seen how the emergence and persistence of family-con-
trolled firms are related to the prevalence of discretionary rule (rather
than the rule of law) in Korea, growing out of institutional structures
of “late” industrialization and the specific ethnic milieus that Chinese
businessmen must adapt to in Southeast Asia. That is different, how-
ever, from claiming that democracy and market capitalism are not pos-
sible in the absence of Anglo-Saxon civil society and the rule of law
and resulting high levels of trust that such societies reflect and subse-
quently foster. The prevalence of family firms does reflect an absence
of universalistic trust and the rule of law in Korea (not to mention a
country like Indonesia), but such practices are rooted in decades of
authoritarianism and the myriad discretionary rules that it has fos-
tered to support and regulate big business, and not in some indelible
(and, therefore, inescapable) cultural trait.
An interventionist state like that in Korea creates a permanent bind
for itself with regard to big business, which in turn deeply prejudices
the emergence of the rule of law. On the one hand, Korea is a paradise
for big business, because state industrial policy favors domestic pro-
ducers over consumers and foreign producers in every manner imag-
inable. As domestic producers become more economically and
politically powerful, however, the state attempts to rein in and tame
the chaebol through regulatory tactics, creating seemingly endless dis-
cretionary rules. These rules have been fickle, irrational, short-lived,
and, quite predictably, ineffective in achieving their goals. Instead,
they create the sense that the rules of the game in Korea are constantly
negotiable.
The government’s dilemma, or “bind,” results from Korea’s credit-
based system for raising capital. In the 1960s, the chaebol relied on mas-
sive foreign aid from the United States and Japan, funds from which
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were vetted through the state-mediated banks. In the 1970s, big busi-
ness relied heavily on cheap capital, so-called policy loans given at
negative real rates (about a 6 percent loan rate in the context of 12 per-
cent inflation, for instance) to those firms willing to conform to the dic-
tates of government industrial strategy. Thus, the state created a
structural incentive for the firms to rely on bank financing and retain
entrepreneurial autonomy by staying closed to the public and inacces-
sible to external audits, especially since access to the bank-loan win-
dow required high levels of political contributions — something that
cannot be entered in the books. In the mid-1990s, prosecutors deter-
mined that, during the 1980s, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo had
amassed more than $1.5 billion in corporate political donations.
Yet the state has also been a relentless nag, trying to force firms to
go public — and failing every time because of the state-created incen-
tive structure. In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 1972 and the
bailout of big business through a sudden moratorium on corporate
repayment of loans to the curb market, the government selected what
it considered “blue chip” firms (based on profitability, equity, and
asset position) and forced them to go public by threatening to slap the
recalcitrants with a 40 percent corporate tax (instead of the usual 27
percent). Overnight, new public stock offerings, valued at $48 million,
inundated the Seoul Stock Exchange, and the number of companies
listed jumped 50 percent. The stock market received a further boost in
1974, when a special presidential decree tightened the audit and super-
vision of bank credit for all nonlisted (but listable, according to govern-
ment standards) firms. Many more measures like these followed in the
1970s. The government also sought to control the securities market by
setting low prices on new issues and determining dividends and cor-
porate reinvestment decisions.
The chaebol found themselves between the proverbial rock and a
hard place, between the state’s punitive measures, on the one hand,
and the forbidding costs of going public, on the other. They lost cheap
bank credits and autonomy in business decision-making and con-
tended with the high costs of raising undervalued equity capital, all
amid continuing government intervention in corporate management.
The corporate response was utterly rational. Some firms decided it was
better to resist the government order, pay the tax, and by-pass the pal-
liatives that the government offered to listed firms. Others obeyed the
government but without really complying: the owners themselves
absorbed much of the newly issued stocks.49 Thus, the equity market in
Korea has remained relatively small.
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The government made matters worse by trying to regulate chaebol,
corporate governance and access to and monopolization of bank
credit, through what surely must be one of the most arcane and
intractable set of “credit controls” (yoshin kwalli) the world has ever
known. In a system where state-mediated bank credit was extended
not on the basis of economic viability but on the exigencies of indus-
trial policy, the only way to prevent default was incessant supervision
and control, ranging from ubiquitous surveillance over the use of
credit (to prevent speculation, for instance) to supervising the reform
of corporate financing structures to creating a web of credit ceilings. In
trying to prevent the concentration of credit in the hands of a few chae-
bol, the government came up with complex rules limiting credits to the
same borrower, limiting credit per individual bank for large borrow-
ers, and establishing credit ceilings for chaebol-affiliated firms. To pre-
vent default, the government developed a series of guidelines for
“early warning,” procedures for “modernizing” credit evaluation, and
intricate rules for default management. A special set of decrees apply-
ing only to the chaebol sought to improve corporate financing struc-
tures, and yet more rules sought to regulate the ratio between equity
and debt in various industrial sectors. To prevent the ever-growing
concentration of the chaebol and suppress their penchant for specula-
tive real-estate acquisition, the state issued complicated requirements
for permission to purchase land, gave various fiscal incentives for
going public, and developed financial breaks for chaebol firms that
“specialize” rather than continue growing into diversified fields.50
The price of the government’s attempt to supplant the financial
market was a regulatory albatross that, in the end, did not achieve its
purpose — judging by the persistent reliance of Korean firms on bank
credit and the continuing family control of business. One has to won-
der what the state of affairs would have been had the government not
intervened. Throughout the 1990s, when credit control got increas-
ingly complicated, the borrowings by the top thirty chaebol as a per-
centage of total bank loans dropped from 19.0 percent in 1990 to 14.5
percent in 1995. Some economists have blamed government regulation
for this drop.51 The logic of Korea, Inc., put the state in the position of
having to proliferate regulations to stem the worst effects of its own
developmental strategy; at best, its efforts could only yield marginal
successes. No regulation or special decree ever changed the essential




VI. Family Governance: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?
About 70 percent of Korea’s chaebol groups remain in the hands of the
founding family, and core responsibility for corporate governance
remains situated at the top. Corporate decision-making still rests at the
“commanding heights,” to use a current term. To truly reform such a
persistent and resilient form of corporate governance is a daunting
task. Clearly, more state regulation is not the answer. The preceding
section would suggest that breaking the nexus between the Korean
state and the chaebol is a more likely avenue toward real reform. But
what about the structure and governance of the firms themselves?
Should they be broken up, given over to professional managers,
encouraged to go public, or continue doing what they have done so
well over the past three decades — keep investing, producing, and
growing? All such measures presuppose an answer to this question: Is
family control of big business necessarily inefficient? The answer is not
as simple as one might think and depends on many things—above all,
the entrepreneurial talent of the family members running the business.
Reflecting on the rise and fall of corporate families, Joseph Schum-
peter remarked that capital accumulation does not happen automati-
cally: “the captured value does not invest itself but must be invested.” By
this he meant that the study of capital accumulation should include
behavior and motive — in other words, from the social “force” to the
responsible individual or family. The crucial factor, he argued, is that
“the social logic or objective situation does not unequivocally deter-
mine how much profit shall be invested, and how it shall be invested,
unless individual disposition is taken into account.”52 Thus, a private corpo-
ration run by able owner-managers can be more effective than one run
by professional managers; although there is no way to insure that such
will always be the case. For every advantage to owner-management of
the big firm, such as speed and flexibility in corporate response, there
is a disadvantage, such as a dearth of professional management skill.
Likewise the owner-manager, by assuming corporate responsibility,
can either create stability for the firm or generate a sense of instability
by being dictatorial and arbitrary in his decision-making. Owner-man-
agers can be more dedicated to the long-term development of the firm,
utilizing their own resources, but it is also easy to imagine a nefarious
collusion between corporate and private accounting.
The Korean chaebol shows both the advantages and disadvantages
of family control. In the early days of industrialization, the can-do
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spirit and dedication of founding entrepreneurs, who made strategic
choices and resource-allocation decisions by themselves, helped
expand business by leaps and bounds. Strong central — even personal
— control gave the chaebol much more integrated command and direc-
tion than conglomerates controlled purely through financial means.
But it is also true that there was too much personal charisma and too
little routinization and institutionalization. In large Korean firms,
assignments are often unclear and overlapping, and the application of
control systems is rarely standardized. A fluidity of roles and responsi-
bilities characterizes top management levels; job rotation is said to be
more frequent than in Japan, with senior managers often transferred
between firms in the same group. Market organization is assumed to
be more self-sufficient than in the Japanese keiretsu system, with less
need to organize market connections to reduce risk and, thus, less
enterprise interdependence and cooperation than in Japan.53 But the
key question is still unanswered: Are the family-run chaebol firms prof-
itable or not?
The conventional wisdom is that the chaebol are not profitable and,
in fact, are not even interested in profit. Their activity, it is said, has
rarely been driven by ordinary market concerns of price or supply and
demand, and instead has long pursued market share, not just operat-
ing at a loss but courting a kind of habitual bankruptcy — should any-
one call them to account on a given day. Perhaps the most telling
statistic comes from the financial crisis in 1997, when it was deter-
mined that, on the eve of the debacle, the total annual profitability
across the top fifty Korean firms was less than 1 percent.
A cross-national study of corporate profitability tells a different
story. Ha-Joon Chang and others have examined “post-interest-pay-
ments” profitability and found that the rate of corporate profit in
Korea is indeed low, as the above data suggest. From 1973 to 1996, the
post-interest-payment profitability of Korean firms was about 2.8 per-
cent, which is low but hardly surprising—given the 333.8 percent debt
to equity ratio for the time period. The same rate for the United States
was 7.9 percent (1995), 5.1 percent for Taiwan (1995), and 4.3 percent
for Japan (1995). Korea’s corporate profitability before interest pay-
ments over the same 1973–96 period, however, was 7.4 percent, which
is close to that of the United States at 7.7 percent and better than Tai-
wan’s at 7.3 percent. In other words, the Korean firm is loaded with
debt, but not unprofitable—a paradox in a market system but not in a
system where the state mediates capital to big firms, with both having
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a hell-bent-for-leather growth perspective. As Chang and others have
argued, low post-interest-payment profitability did not harm invest-
ment momentum in Korea because government measures ensured that
the income appropriated by the financial sector would be circuited
back to the manufacturing corporate sector, thus promoting continued
investment.54
If the Korean sector as a whole is not particularly inefficient in com-
parison to that in the United States or Taiwan, is the same true of
Korea’s large chaebol firms when compared to smaller domestic firms?
A study of profitability and productivity comparing big business with
medium- and small-size firms shows that on average there is no big dif-
ference between the two groups; the record for the chaebol firms tended
to be erratic, however, with some affiliated firms showing very high
profitability and productivity and others not. Big firms, however, tend
to possess long-term advantages because of their relentless drive to
expand market shares, whether at home or abroad. In that sense, the
strength of the chaebol should be measured secularly, over long
swatches of time, rather than parsed into annual measures of pure pro-
ductivity. The Korean economist Yu Sungmin also argues that the chae-
bol have been able to overcome market imperfections through internal
organization and reorganization. In a context where most markets (the
labor market, financial market, technology market, the market for cor-
porate managers) functioned improperly, the chaebol compensated by
creating an internal world of their own, enacting a kind of do-it-your-
self industrial reorganization.55 In its purpose and design, this analysis
suggests, the chaebol constitute the more perfect microcosm of an
imperfect macrocosm, a prophylactic realm insulated from or seeking
to offset the flaws of the Korean business world.
Except for Alice Amsden’s examination of the Korean ability to
absorb technology, or “learning-by-doing,” this organizational aspect
of the chaebol has not received much scrutiny,56 But the fact that they
kept increasing market share at home and abroad attests to their orga-
nizational ability. The effective presence of Korean firms in the fledg-
ling markets of Eastern Europe, the Central Asian Republics, and other
emerging areas is testimony to the advantage that accrues from having
a vast, flexible, and well-coordinated internal organization. This suc-
cess should be considered alongside the well-known inefficiencies of
the so-called convoy system, whereby even the most inefficient unit of
the chaebol group is kept afloat through intricate financing agreements.
In short, it is important to remember both the good and the bad in the
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chaebol, because reform is only possible with the knowledge of what
worked in the best of times, as well as what failures brought on the
worst of times.
VII. Efforts at Corporate Reform in Korea
We have only briefly assessed the politics of the chaebol, but that was
the overwhelming focus of Korean attention in the mid-1990s, as one
chaebol leader after another was brought into the docket and shown to
have lined the pockets of all the leading politicians as far back as the
1960s. Although the image of the flagship firms responsible for the
Korean miracle was deeply tarnished, this hugely important phenome-
non signaled the arrival, finally, of democratic politics in Korea. And it
is only through democratic means that the deep nexus between the
chaebol and the authoritarian state could be broken. The best news for
those interested in chaebol reform is simply that real reform is now pos-
sible, given the election of two successive civilian presidents (Kim
Young Sam in 1992 and Kim Dae Jung in 1997) and the impetus of a
crisis in the economy unparalleled since the Korean War.
In the middle of an analogous crisis, U.S. President Franklin Roo-
sevelt, in his message to Congress in 1938, called for an investigation of
concentrated economic power: “The liberty of a democracy,” he said,
“is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point
where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself.”57 In
Korea, the problem of private power is as President Roosevelt
described it, but much more so. Politicians and political parties col-
lected huge amounts of money from the chaebol, offering in return loan
guarantees to sustain these highly leveraged firms. No firm could
avoid paying out one day lest it be declared “bankrupt” the next. The
recent investigations, ultimately leading to the incarceration of two
previous presidents and several big business leaders, revealed to the
Korean people the operational method of patronage. Korea, Inc.
proved to be far more arbitrary than Japan, Inc.: especially in the 1980s,
a racketeering state was the flip side of the much-touted developmen-
tal state, as the earlier, more systemic pattern of chaebol support for the
ruling groups devolved into a kind of mad extortionism.
President Kim Dae Jung, long a dissident who was the object of
chaebol-provisioned political funding (he nearly won his first presiden-
tial campaign in 1971 in spite of widespread irregularities and munifi-
cent support for Park Chung Hee—(whereupon there were no more
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elections until 1987) needs no tutoring in the politics or the economic
liabilities of the state-chaebol relationship. He wrote in his 1985 book,
“The Korean economy . . . has been plagued by inefficient allocation of
valuable resources . . . [which is] the result of government interference
in almost every aspect of market functions, including pricing, credit
allocation, industrial location decisions, and labor-management rela-
tions. This interference has left the Korean economy in a state of seri-
ous imbalance. The imbalances . . . [include those] between large
conglomerates and small or medium-sized firms.”58 The economic cri-
sis gives him the leverage needed to pursue real reform of the Korean
system, for the first time since it was established in the 1960s.
Since his election in December 1997, President Kim has reiterated
his resolve to tackle “the chaebol problem” by instituting the rule of law
and bringing transparency throughout the nexus of the state, the
banks, and the chaebol. The establishment of effective rule of law
requires, however, a particular kind of “mentality,” to resort to Max
Weber once again. The interventionist state in Korea has been pro-
foundly results-oriented, privileging outcomes over established proce-
dures and rules. This mentality is evident in the various liberalization
policies that Korea has enacted over the years.
Import liberalization, for instance, has rarely meant competitive lib-
eralization, but refers instead to ad hoc measures like the “import-
diversification policy” designed to keep out Japanese products or to
prevent monopolization in the domestic distribution of imports. Like-
wise, deregulation usually meant reducing the number of procedural
and administrative regulations and not promoting more competition.
Even the people in charge of competition policy were often confused
by what competition really meant, and whether it was actually con-
ducive to creating competitiveness. A series of interviews with officials
at the Fair Trade Commission (which was created in 1980 as an
antitrust watchdog) revealed that most did not actually believe that
more competition would increase the competitiveness of Korean firms.
Privatization reforms also moved slowly, both because of opposition
from vested interests and for fear that the chaebol would simply absorb
any newly privatized state firms. More generally, in the last two
decades, state policy toward the chaebol has been profoundly complex
and contradictory, relying on its discretionary power more to protect
and discipline the chaebol than to expose them to a transparent legal
regime and a real environment of competition.
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In the past, the objective of financial regulatory policy centered on
the reform of the always hugely leveraged corporate finance. In 1974,
the government launched a series of elaborate ad hoc measures to curb
chaebol reliance on the banking system and, in 1980, followed up with
an effort to force big businesses to develop “core competence” and
shed their large number of subsidiaries. The government closely moni-
tored chaebol use of bank credit, expanded external audits, and by the
middle of the 1980s, instituted a consistent policy package based on
fair-trade laws. In 1992, the fair-trade law was again fortified, the use
of intersubsidiary loan guarantees was restricted (if not abolished),
and the loan ceiling for some chaebol core industries was relaxed in
another effort to enforce “specialization.” All these efforts came to
naught: the chaebols in 1997 remained as leveraged as they were in 1969
(when Korea experienced its first major debt crisis) or in the 1970s
(when they were hungry recipients of the outright subsidies known as
“policy loans”) or after the flurry of attempted reform in the early
1980s and early 1990s. The problem of nonperforming loans has not
abated either, but has remained more or less steady for the past thirty
years.
The failures of past reform efforts have taught two significant
lessons. One is that the most egregious chaebol practices, like intersub-
sidiary loan guarantees, should have been simply outlawed. Instead,
the government issued a series of complicated regulations and dead-
lines to reduce the extent of these guarantees, fearing to abolish out-
right a practice that helped maintain the organic unity of the chaebol
(by making it difficult for inefficient firms to “exit” without taking the
whole group down). The Korean banks have long eschewed credit
analysis, given decades of credit rationing, so the intersubsidiary loan
guarantees (along with the demand for large collateral, usually in real
estate) enabled banks to reduce their exposure. The idea was that the
loan guarantee turned the entire chaebol group into a gigantic chunk of
collateral, and since it was highly unlikely that the entire group would
fail (or that the state would let it fail), this was the second-best option
for the banks in the absence of thorough credit analysis (which was
impossible anyway, given closely held and deceptive chaebol methods
of accounting). For the chaebol, the intersubsidiary loan system was a
quick way to raise a lot of capital, even if this meant that ailing firms
could threaten the health of other firms. The loan-guarantee scheme
also, of course, belied the pretense that all chaebol affiliates were legally
independent entities, thus bolstering the organic unity of the group. In
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1993, a newly elected government finally decided that the loan guaran-
tees had to go, once and for all. Faced with furious opposition from the
chaebol, however, Kim Young Sam compromised by setting a three-
year deadline for reducing the guarantees to 200 percent of equity.
According to the Fair Trade Commission, in March 1992, intersub-
sidiary loan guarantees of the top thirty chaebol stood at 538 percent of
their equity, but steadily dropped down until they met the 1996 dead-
line of 200 percent.59
Another lesson from the past is the failure of various efforts to force
the firms to specialize in core industries and not duplicate each other’s
efforts. Simply stated, a quarter-century of failure is testimony again to
the power of the chaebol to resist state-of-the art discretionary policies
and regulations. All told, this history attests to the continuing power of
big business in Korea rather than to the successes of reform. No gov-
ernment could imagine dismantling the system until the financial crisis
of 1997 forced the issue.
In the wake of this crisis, the new Korean government has instituted
a number of measures to force corporate reform, including ending the
system of intersubsidiary loan guarantees, posting deadlines to bring
the corporate debt-equity ratio down, and forcing those chaebol firms
that cannot service their debt without support of their affiliates to go
bankrupt. The new administration of Kim Dae Jung has also
demanded a so-called Big Deal, meaning a swap of key subsidiaries so
that each of the top chaebol will emerge stronger in the areas of its “core
competence.” This would reduce overlapping investments and allow
surplus production capacity to be closed down.60 Some of these mea-
sures, such as the decisive ending of the intersubsidiary loans (might-
ily helped by the demands made by the International Monetary Fund),
are important departures from the past; others are not departures but
are continuations of the past government policy, albeit with more
“teeth.”
Evidence in the first half of 1998 clearly indicates that Kim wants to
break up the cozy relations of the big firms with the government and
the banks. He has sought in a variety of ways to share the pain of the
IMF bailout fairly, throughout the society. And for the first time in
Korean history, he has given labor a strong voice at the bargaining
table with business and government — certainly a major achievement
and one that has generally kept labor from major strikes and disrup-
tions, in the face of unemployment that tripled in one year (from 2 per-
cent in mid-1997 to over 6 percent in mid-1998). It remains to be seen if
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Kim intends to downsize or even dismantle the chaebol, which would
require a systemic set of antitrust measures and competition policies
that would be effective in the Korean context. It seems more likely that
he hopes, through various reform measures, to free the chaebol of state
regulators and preferential lending — a kind of marketization strategy
that will end the worst external problems of corporate governance and
open these firms to more competitive pressures, but that will do little
to reform chaebol governance internally.
In considering the potential of Korean reform, it might be useful to
label the various efforts the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. The ugly
aspect refers to the political practices of the chaebol — the massive
exchange of bribes and political favoritism that should be excised from
the Korean system and that, under the new administration, most likely
will be. The bad refers to the economic deficiencies of the chaebol that
must be changed — the lack of competitiveness in certain industries
resulting in their excessive concern to expand market shares. The Kim
administration is focusing on this problem more than anything, trying
to get the groups to shed their many unprofitable subsidiaries and to
concentrate on a few successful core businesses. Reforms in this area
might move Korea closer to the structure of the postwar Japanese
keiretsu, a highly unpopular idea from the standpoint of 1998 but one
that obviously makes sense in evolutionary terms. Finally, there is the
good, or the economic virtues of the chaebol. This good — the essential
logic of the chaebol — needs to be maintained and even nurtured. At
least that is the way all Koreans, reformers or not, will see the problem.
Much of the current reform effort is still being done through gov-
ernment edict rather than legislative deliberation and rule-making.
Even the current democratic reformers favor the use of discretionary
measures by the government because Korea, after all, has one of the
oldest and finest traditions of civil service and, counting the colonial
period, a century of state-directed economic growth. In times of crisis,
there is a strong temptation to use this ubiquitous state structure to
force industrial reorganization; the bureaucrats — who come from the
best universities and constitute a respected and experienced elite —
cling to the belief that the next regulation is the one that will finally
achieve real reform. The history of such reform, however, should teach
the Korean government that perhaps it is better to change the incentive
structure and the rules of the game and stick to them—in other words,
institute the rule of law — rather than try yet another round of indus-
trial reorganization. It is time to try the path not taken: develop an
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abiding rule of law applicable to both corporations and the govern-
ment.
At the end of the day, Max Weber’s insight is still valid — that the
essence of modernity is the rationalization as well as the professional-
ization of economic and political management and that modernity is
unthinkable apart from rational bureaucracy and the separation of the
household from the corporation. In Korea, too, the predominance of
the family-controlled firms must change, as routine replaces charisma,
and as what began in the 1960s as the frenetic attempt to emulate
Japan’s success becomes more settled and institutionalized. The
change will come slowly but surely, paralleling the development of the
equity market and the increasing globalization of the Korean economy.
VIII. The Politics of Ethnicity and Corporate Governance 
in Southeast Asia
The modal firms in Korea and in Southeast Asia are family businesses,
big and small, that operate not within the bounds of a well-established
rule of law but amid the uncertainties of many decades of authoritar-
ian rule. But there the similarities end. Korea’s economic development
has been marked by ubiquitous industrial policy (now made residual),
with the state creating and re-creating the business class, protecting
and disciplining its members. Because Southeast Asian states are bereft
of industrial policy, except where it is a device to buttress the econom-
ically disadvantaged ethnic majority, they have had a (relatively) free
market, punctuated by economic affirmative action of sorts. The
upshot is that family businesses in Southeast Asia rely less on the eth-
nically alien government and, of course, less on government-mediated
capital. Thus, the business class in the heterogeneous Southeast Asia
was forced into self-sufficiency and onto the market.
The differences were overdetermined, from the days of colonialism.
If Japanese colonialism bequeathed to the Koreans the template of the
authoritarian interventionist state and the zaibatsu, European colonial-
ism bequeathed the opposite: minimal taxation, strict avoidance of
deficits, and an unprotected market. Professor K. S. Jomo attributes the
habits and practices of Chinese businesses in Southeast Asia to their
historical inability to rely on the colonial government; even when the
state and the legal system became more accessible to Chinese business
interests, a “Chinese business idiom” persisted that abjured close asso-
ciation with the government.61 Colonial governments also left a legacy
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of an ethnic division of labor and a cobbled together concept of the
nation—best exemplified by Malaysia.
Malaysia had its origins in an explicitly negotiated “bargain” that
set the stage for a peaceful transfer of power from the British in 1957.
This bargain, reached between ethnic political parties representing the
Malay, Chinese, and Indians, became the basis for a coalition that has
ruled Malaysia since independence. Malaysia has practiced the most
pronounced policy of “apartheid,” Ruth McVey argues, because it was
also the last to be independent from the British rule.62 Elsewhere, ethnic
compacts occurred more haphazardly, but the generalization — cob-
bled-together nations, ethnic divisions of labor — holds for most of
Southeast Asia.
Since independence, however, Southeast Asian countries were
favored by the same external environment that favored Japan, Korea,
and Taiwan. They enjoyed political and economic patronage by the
United States during the Cold War, supporting stable, anticommunist
regimes, and a close economic relationship with Japan, which soon
emerged as the major industrial power and, later, the single most
important external investor in the region, from Korea to Indonesia.
Added to that was the exclusion of China: in the words of Benedict
Anderson, the “extraordinary forty year sequestration from the global
market of the greatest power in Asia—namely China.”
Exclusion, yes, except for the Chinese diaspora, that is. The one glar-
ing difference between Northeast and Southeast Asia was the critical
economic role of this marginalized minority. The Chinese business
presence is as old as the merchants who prospered in the ancient trib-
ute-trade system of the region, linking Japan, Korea, and China
together with Central Asian and Middle Eastern trade routes (a Chi-
nese presence that the European colonizers found useful in their own
penetration of Southeast Asia in centuries past). The modern diaspora,
however, was peopled by the millions of young, mostly male, mostly
illiterate people, who, between the Opium Wars in the 1840s and the
onset of the Sino-Japanese War in the 1890s, left the coastal districts of
Fukien and Kwangtung for the labor-hungry European colonies in
Southeast Asia and independent Thailand. They spoke mutually unin-
telligible languages such as Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, Hainanese,
and Teochiu, and scarcely regarded themselves as Chinese.63 In Thai-
land and Malaysia, they formed the bulk of the working class, but sig-
nificant numbers also worked their way up the occupational ladder to
become small traders, entrepreneurs, and professionals. Particularly in
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the Dutch East Indies, such people came to form a middle tier between
the colonial administrative apparatus and the peasant bulk of the
indigenous population. The Chinese used their positions as intermedi-
aries between Western big business and the local economy to gain
knowledge of modern trade, manufacturing techniques, and the local
market. They also were the interlocutors when Japanese firms sought
to reestablish their presence in Southeast Asia after World War II.64
A variety of barriers maintained this racial division of labor. In the
early stages of development, Chinese immigrants were excluded from
peasant production by lack of access to land, and were concentrated in
wage labor, while indigenous peasants were excluded from commer-
cial activity by lack of access to capital and market outlets. Because
they were denied access to land, the Chinese tended to keep their
assets in liquid form and to invest in economic activities that generated
quick returns. This racial divide quickly became a vertical division of
labor as well, as upwardly mobile Chinese entered into commercial
activity, often as intermediaries between indigenous peasant produc-
ers and the world market, and obtained higher returns from their
investments of capital and labor. Soon the indigenes shook loose from
the land and joined wage labor at the bottom of the economic hierar-
chy.65
This phenomenon of the middlemen, or so-called pariah minority, is
a familiar one in Europe, where the kings and magnates found them
less threatening in some cases than their own population and, there-
fore, encouraged them to play brokering roles. “Pariah capitalism”
became a subject of serious inquiry in the late nineteenth century,
chiefly by German sociologists, including Werner Sombart and Max
Weber, and as early as 1875, analogies were being made between the
Jews in Europe and the Chinese in Southeast Asia.66 The position of the
pariah minority was always precarious because of their different eth-
nicity and because of the activities that they engaged in, such as money
lending, petty trade, and tax farming, all considered odious by the
existing social morality.
Notwithstanding wide variations from country to country, the gen-
eral sociological trend in Southeast Asia after independence was for
upwardly mobile “natives” to claim positions in the political realm
(state bureaucracies, military, and police), especially in Malaysia and
Indonesia; the people of Chinese ancestry were relegated to the private
commercial sector. Benedict Anderson reminds us that from 1966 to
1998 not a single person of known Chinese descent became a cabinet
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minister, senior civil servant, general, admiral, or air marshal in
Indonesia. Yet the Chinese in Indonesia have been called “the race that
counts,” according to Adam Schwarz, and almost all of the biggest
“crony capitalists” around Suharto came from this group. This “racial”
division of labor has made a marginalized minority the “real domestic
motor of the ‘miracle,’ ” has limited the growth of a vigorous “native”
entrepreneurial class, and has encouraged massive profiteering on the
part of state officials.67
How is the “real domestic motor of the ‘miracle’” distributed across
Southeast Asia? In Malaysia, the ethnic Chinese are 29 percent of the
population but account for some 69 percent of share capital by market
capitalization. In the Philippines, ethnic Chinese are said to be only 2
percent of the population but control 50 to 60 percent of share capital
by market capitalization. In Thailand, an estimated 10 percent of the
population are ethnic Chinese, accounting for 81 percent of listed firms
by market capitalization. In Indonesia, ethnic Chinese are an estimated
3.5 percent of the population, controlling 73 percent of the same. And
in Chinese-dominated Singapore, they account for 77 percent of the
population, representing some 81% of listed firms by market capital-
ization.68
The politics of this racial division works differently in different loca-
tions. In a culturally and racially assimilated Thailand, there is little
organized opposition to the Sino-Thai business predominance, and the
same is true of the Philippines, where the Chinese have long intermar-
ried with the Spanish mestizo elites, to the extent that today some 10
percent of the population claim partial Chinese ancestry (compared
with 2 percent “pure” Chinese). In Malaysia, assimilation has been
more limited, with the government committed to a race-based eco-
nomic policy — known as the New Economic Policy (1970 – 90) — to
boost Malay corporate ownership from a piddling 1.9 percent to some
30 percent by 1990. The non-Malay ownership would remain the same,
according to this scheme, at about 40 percent, and foreign ownership
was to fall from 60.7 percent in 1970 to about 30 percent in the 1990s. In
Indonesia, the Chinese are scattered throughout the archipelago
(unlike the Sino-Thais, who are concentrated in Bangkok), but the big
Chinese businesses exchange state protection for economic patronage
through close ties with the military and the ruling group. The Salim
Group of Indonesia is reportedly the world’s largest Chinese-owned
conglomerate, accounting for some 8 percent of the Indonesian GNP.
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All this makes the reform of corporate governance a distinctly different
enterprise than it is in Northeast Asia.
But what an enterprise it is! It thrives in highly adverse political cir-
cumstances, finds opportunities in the unlikeliest places, and turns
adversities into advantages. Unlike industrial leaders in Korea or
Japan who have stuck with one big idea (industrial policy), Chinese
“pariah” capitalists have quickly adapted themselves to policy deci-
sions made by the alien ethnic elites, who have but a single advantage
over the Chinese in that they hold state power. Chinese businesses
have thrived in all milieus, under both protectionist and liberal
regimes. For instance, occasional nationalist restrictions on foreign-
owned enterprises tended to help the Chinese by limiting competition,
and when the foreign firms were localized, the Chinese often found
themselves the logical partners. With import-substitution industrial-
ization, the local-ownership requirement often helped the Chinese
acquire foreign technology, and “local-content” requirements in indus-
tries such as automobiles also created new business opportunities for
local Chinese enterprises. But the Chinese have also done well with
structural adjustment and liberal market-oriented economic-reform
programs (involving trade and investment regimes, financial reforms,
deregulation, and privatization of state-owned enterprises), which fre-
quently hurt the local private sector in the short run. These policies are
more readily effected in Southeast Asia than in other developing coun-
tries because of the political weakness of the Chinese-dominated local
private sector; instead of resisting the state, the Chinese just made the
best of their opportunities, as usual. The Chinese were also protected
against the tight monetary policies, credit rationing, and high interest
rates characteristic of macroeconomic stabilization policies. This is
because they have disproportionate access to alternative sources of
capital abroad, from informal ethnic-based credit networks at home to
internal financing in Chinese conglomerates (many of which own their
own banks), and preferred-customer status among other local banks
(most of which are Chinese owned).69
The principle of corporate governance in the Chinese firms in
Southeast Asia is said to be the same as the Chinese family business
elsewhere, as in Taiwan and Hong Kong. This does not mean that cer-
tain cultural traits are immutable but it does mean that there is a her-
itage of economic organization through clan lineage and pang
(speech-group) networks, that seems conducive to economic success at
earlier stages of commercial activity. The Chinese term most often
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used to describe business groups is not caifa (a translation for zaibatsu
or chaebol), or qiyejituan (for kigyo shudan) but rather quanxiqiye, mean-
ing “related enterprise.” Guanxi refers to particularistic connections
between persons that are based on some common or shared identifica-
tion, and Ichiro Numazaki defines a quanxiqiye is defined as a “cluster
of enterprises owned and controlled by a group of persons tied by a
network of various guanxi.”70
Most Chinese family businesses are small and highly specialized,
and prefer informal sources of finance — family members, close
friends, revolving credit associations, or the unregulated “curb,” as, for
example, in Taiwan. As the firms get bigger, the reliance on network
tends to become attenuated, in favor of thicker ties with outsiders, for
greater economic opportunities as well as political protection. Today, it
is the small, or merely unsuccessful, businessmen who, lacking such
fortuitous outside arrangements, still must resort to Chinese lineage
and home-village associations. These facts form the basis of Linda
Lim’s argument that the peculiarities of Chinese business organization
were neither necessary nor sufficient as an explanation of Chinese eco-
nomic dominance or monopoly of particular lines of business in South-
east Asia.71
When Chinese family firms engage in “opportunistic diversifica-
tion,” it is with retained profits of the existing firms (unlike the Korean
chaebol) under the management of a family member or another highly
trusted close associate. And even when they grow and diversify (as,
say, in Hong Kong), they tend to think in terms of their long experi-
ence in the textile industry, and their major managerial skills and com-
mitments reflect it. Where investment requirements are too great or
there are needs for political and business connections, the families
enter into alliances with trusted partners to set up new businesses,
thus forming the Chinese “business groups” that operate in a variety
of industries. These are not integrated through a central administrative
hierarchy like the Korean chaebol; instead, they operate like partner-
ships united by common investments and mutual trust in which the
critical locus of decision-making and control remains the individual
family business. Large Chinese family businesses span a number of
fields and are interconnected through a network of alliances and ties
between family heads; in contrast again to the Korean chaebol, Chinese
businesses combine managerial specialization with entrepreneurial
diversification.72 The strategic preferences of the Chinese family firm
include reliance on price and cost competition, short payback periods
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for new investments, the intensive use of resources, and a reluctance to
share control or responsibility; risks are managed largely by restricting
commitments and maximizing resource flexibility.73
In Hong Kong, where there are many public companies, the typical
Chinese-run family business invites outside equity participation by
offering a minority stake in a public company within the network of
family firms. Control of this public company stays within the family
through direct investment in the equity by other family companies and
family members, cross-holdings and cross-directorships with related
companies associated with the family group, and other arrangements
yielding an element of control with related parties.74 The familism of
the Chinese firm also points to the pervasiveness of the so-called Bud-
denbrooks phenomenon: indeed, the typical successful Chinese family
business is said to go through four distinct phases—emergent, central-
ized, segmented, and disintegrative—in about three generations.
To some, like Francis Fukuyama, this pattern is the Chinese counter-
part to the cycle that the Irish call “from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves.” It
attests to the Chinese reluctance to develop and use professional man-
agement, and indicates a real problem with forward integration, espe-
cially in unfamiliar markets.75 But to the Schumpeterian mindset, the
Chinese Buddenbrooks would indicate something else — a world of
perpetual destruction and creation in which the Chinese family busi-
ness operates, where flexibility and innovation count as they should,
and the families involved cannot rely on the state or some other politi-
cal benefactor to bail them out. In any case, it is a world far apart from
Northeast Asia. The reform of corporate governance in Southeast Asia
toward ideal-typical Western standards seems tantamount to asking
Chinese businesses to stop being—well, Chinese.
IX. Conclusion
The primary purpose of this essay is to suggest that the focal point of
reform should be Northeast Asia, especially Korea; it should also be
reform with an eye cocked toward China, in order to preclude the
development there of similar methods of corporate governance (given
that China’s leaders are increasingly attracted to the Northeast Asian
model of industrial development). It was by no means only during the
last year, or only under sharp IMF scrutiny, when people suddenly
discovered big problems in the Korean economy. The current financial
crisis gripping Korea should not have come as such a surprise, since it
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is the third such massive financial crisis Korea has experienced since
the country “took-off” more than thirty years ago — and it is not even
the first to earn the epithet “the worst crisis since the Korean War” (as
Kim Dae Jung called it in his inaugural address). Koreans said the
same about the debt crisis of 1979 – 83, when Korea had difficulty ser-
vicing large outstanding foreign debts (about $40 million, third rank-
ing in the world) — a crisis that produced modest financial
liberalization in the early 1980s.
The Korean financial system has always been joined at the hip to the
huge and hugely leveraged conglomerates, and it has always been vul-
nerable to external shocks, which threaten to bring the whole economy
down like a house of cards. That this did not happen until 1997, how-
ever, was mainly because of security concerns owing to the Cold War
and the conflict with North Korea: in the past, the United States and
Japan promptly stepped in with large amounts of aid and credits (e.g.,
the $4 billion package from Tokyo in January 1983) to reactivate the
economy. Even though each financial crisis pointed to the urgency of
reforming the chaebol, prompt external support meant that nothing was
really done. In spite of sharp criticism, the chaebol continued to grow
like Topsy. Why?
The main reason is the problem we began with: Korean public good
and private interest are rolled together into one large complex that is
bent on rapid industrial growth. There is also considerable truth to the
old adage that “nothing succeeds like success.” After each of its two
previous financial crises, Korea resumed prolonged, double-digit eco-
nomic growth. This probably will not occur again, however, which
means the reform of Korean corporate governance has finally become
a stark necessity of the new administration. It is impossible to predict
how this newly embarked-upon reform will develop, but we can now
sum up what is likely to happen.
The first “pointer” is that Koreans are likely to think of the whole
issue not in terms of legislating a new atmosphere in which the rule of
law prevails, but in terms of what changes will again make the chaebol
world-competitive firms. Korea, with or without reform, will long
remain a “developmental” rather than “regulatory” political economy.
This insight is often forgotten amid much talk today about the need for
new forms of regulation: the Korean crisis must have stemmed from
lax regulation, ergo, the need to regulate anew. At the root of the West-
ern concern for regulation is a doctrine of fairness, of creating level
playing fields and competitive environments. This mode of regulating
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the corporate sector is not likely to work in the near future, because the
concept of regulation carries different meaning and intent in the
Northeast Asian context. For all the talk about the rule of law—even if,
in the final analysis, that is the most critical element in changing corpo-
rate governance and in breaking the state-bank-business nexus—regu-
latory reforms most likely will be pushed with an eye to honing
Korea’s competitiveness. Koreans will have no interest in reforms that
weaken their competitive firms or create level playing fields where the
strong gobble up the weak.
The Republic of Korea has long represented the essential “develop-
mental state,” which, as I have argued, may be a paradise for big busi-
ness; but in spite of the “crony capitalism” and “moral hazards” to
which the IMF refers, it did succeed in making globe-ranging competi-
tive Korean firms. Development and competition are the key; in the
end, all Koreans are economic nationalists, including the new presi-
dent, because they believe that, in a predatory world economy, they
can afford to be nothing less. We cannot expect that the current finan-
cial crisis will bring closure to four decades of developmentalism
unless we believe that history means nothing. Nor can we expect that a
particular type of mentality can disappear overnight because it was
proved wrong in 1998. The current administration in Korea has
already done more than all previous administrations combined to
bring about democracy in Korea, but its starting point for dealing with
the chaebol remains the same as that of the previous regimes: tried and
true discretionary measures to force industrial reorganization, some-
thing as revealing as it is predictable.
The second fact to remember in contemplating the reform of Korean
corporate governance is that the chaebol may have emerged in the last
thirty years, but the model goes back seventy years. This is another
way of saying that we must be sensitive to “path dependency,” to a
pattern of Northeast Asian development that has characterized the
whole twentieth century. Korea is not a leopard that can instantly
change its spots (a point that is vividly illustrated by contemporary
Japanese immobilism in the face of eight years of recession). But we do
not preclude the possibility of what Barrington Moore once said—that
big changes are often easier than small changes. A radical reform
might, therefore, be possible. The conditions couldn’t be better: a new,
popular reform leadership coming to power amid palpable crisis,
yielding the best opportunity since the Korean War to truly transform
the system. Nonetheless, reforms, no matter how big, will be consistent
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with what has gone before. (It is interesting to note that the man in
charge of sabre-rattling before the chaebol on behalf of Kim Dae Jung is
none other than Pak Tae-jun, the captain of Korea’s steel industry; he
built up and long directed P’ohang Steel, and is known to be as famil-
iar with the Japanese system as any Korean capitalist. So perhaps the
ROK will again take cures from Japan—this time, postwar Japan.)
What is this postwar Japanese system to which Korea might con-
form? Masahiko Aoki argues that management acts as a mediator in
the policy-making process, striking a balance between the interests of
shareholders and those of employees. The enterprise union functions
as a substructure of the firm and represents employees in the decision-
making process.76 Given the ubiquitous presence of enterprise-union
organization in Korea, the Japanese example might also argue for
Korean labor reforms along the same lines, which would be a good
counterpart to the historically unprecedented “peak bargaining” that
Kim Dae Jung directed in January 1998 between top representatives of
business, labor, and government. If this were to be institutionalized,
the ROK would then resemble Japan’s postwar pattern of political cor-
poratism, as a political scientist would understand it.
Before this system became viable in Japan, the firm had to meet
three historical conditions. The first was the dismantling of family con-
trol of the firms, through Occupation policies in 1946 and 1947. This
involved a “managerial revolution from above” through the dispersal
of share ownership as part of the dissolution of zaibatsu holding com-
panies and the replacement of previous managers by young or new
ones who were less loyal to the zaibatsu family. The second was a move
toward Cooperative Enterprise Unions, resulting from the defeat of
various labor actions in the late 1950s. The third was an effective insu-
lation from hostile takeovers through the development of mutual
shareholding between companies and financial institutions, notably
city banks. This was facilitated by the stock-market crash of 1964 – 65,
the government purchase and freezing of stocks to stabilize the mar-
ket, and later, a concerted action by the interlocking companies to
repurchase stocks, in part to stave off foreign takeovers.77
Obviously, these conditions are not going to obtain in contemporary
Korea. But it is possible that the chaebol might, mutatis mutandis, move
in the direction of the keiretsu. The keiretsu is an advancement on the
evolutionary scale of the economic combines in Japan, a rational/legal
form of the more feudal zaibatsu. To the extent that the chaebol was a
postcolonial mutation of the zaibatsu, it would be wrong not to exam-
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ine the logic of historical change in Japan with an eye to what is possi-
ble in Korea. The major problem with Korea moving toward the
keiretsu is that the structure is predicated on domestic insularity and
exclusivity, something that goes against the grain of the globalized
world and against the immediate Korean necessity of attracting more
foreign capital. That, and the fact that effective keiretsu reform took two
decades in Japan.
Finally, we come back again to the “good” aspects of the chaebol pat-
tern. For much of postwar Korean history, the chaebol were in many
ways the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs of Korean development, or
what he called “ephors” of capitalism. Their mammoth structure and
even their inveterate reliance on state-mediated bank credit made
sense, especially given the immaturity of financial markets and
Korea’s strategy to make an assault on the world market, to wipe the
floor with the advanced countries in product areas such as semicon-
ductors, heavy and chemical industry items, petrochemicals, automo-
biles, and other machines. Erecting these strategies required massive
investments that far exceeded retained earnings. This developmental
aspect is not likely to go away, but rather will be modified or reformed
to fit current circumstances. Korea’s chaebol have had built-in advan-
tages in economies of scale, and that is not likely to change either—nor
should it. (In fact, trade statistics for Korea in early 1998 show that it
was precisely the items just mentioned that have recorded an average
of 30 percent growth in exports, with exports of steel products mark-
ing a 44.5 percent growth. By contrast, exports of the older-style,
declining labor-intensive goods recorded a 9.9 percent growth.
Regardless, the fact remains that there ought to be great change in
the corporate governance of the chaebol, allowing more transparency,
external audits, foreign participation, and more accountable manage-
ment. There should be an effective institution guaranteeing minority
shareholder rights and transparency in accounting. The power and
function of the board of directors should be bolstered, and the role of
institutional investors should grow as well, through financial deepen-
ing. Realistically, however, the Korean firm will become “more like
us” only up to a point, to use James Fallows’s phrase. For half a cen-
tury, the United States has sought to make Korea “more like us,” but
the problem of reforming an economic model deeply influenced by
Japan’s industrial success remains.
Likewise, we should be wary of the kind of triumphalism reflected
in Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history,” according to which the Chi-
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nese family firm is the mere reflection of low-trust societies crippled by
the absence of civil society. On the contrary, the Chinese family firms
that characterize Southeast Asian capitalism are perhaps the most flex-
ible and adaptive entrepreneurial units in the world today. Sometimes,
the behavior of these firms reflects a harsh world bereft of universal
trust. But the reverse is also true, that the Chinese family firm is at ease
with a world of trust as Fukuyama would define it. Witness, for exam-
ple, the enormous success of diasporic Chinese business in highly
articulated civil societies like Vancouver and Toronto. Perhaps global
capitalism, with its free movement of goods and services, has made the
most singularly pre-modern of corporate governance forms, the Chi-
nese family firm, into the most highly adaptable, multicultural, post-
modern firm, able to navigate in any economic waters.
This is another way of saying that no one-size corporate governance
fits all, even in the globalized world of unforgiving investors and
school-marmish IMF officials. No matter how severe the pressure for
organizational convergence, it is unlikely that we will see the emer-
gence, at the “end of history” as it were, of one superior form of corpo-
rate government to which all can adhere. It is worth remembering that
it was not visionaries standing at the doorstep of the twenty-first cen-
tury but culture-bound writers of the mid-nineteenth century who
“looked forward to a single, more or less standardized world where all
governments would acknowledge the truths of political economy and
liberalism would be carried throughout the globe by impersonal mis-
sionaries more powerful than those of Christianity or Islam had ever
been; a world reshaped in the image of the bourgeoisie, perhaps even
one from which, eventually, national differences would disappear.”78
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